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COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING IN AGE DISCRIMI-
NATION CASES: A PROPER READING OF THE STATUTE?
With enactment of a statute to bar discrimination based on
age,I the Ninetieth Congress succeeded where earlier sessions had
failed.2 Analogizing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) to earlier legislation barring discrimination based
upon race, religion, color, and sex,3 and further citing President
Lyndon Johnson's support for the legislation, 4 Congress stated
the purpose of the Act to be the promotion of "employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age."'
The press scarcely acknowledged enactment of the ADEA,
and reaction was similar in the courts for several years following
its passage. Over four years after the bill's enactment, a federal
district judge declared that "[t]here appear to be only two re-
ported cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967."1
After a period of dormancy, growing public awareness of
what is prohibited by the ADEA and stronger governmental inter-
est in its enforcement have brought about a sharp increase in
ADEA litigation.8 Decisions interpreting the language of several
provisions of the statute have produced divergent opinions.' This
1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602,
as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74, and Act of April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as
ADEA].
2. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2213, 2214.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 8. See also 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
6. Buried in the back pages of the next day's New York Times was a three column
inch wire story, Bill to Help Older Workers Approved by Both Houses. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1967, at 32, col. 8.
7. Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 233 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
8. Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. Rav. 227 (1974).
9. Judge Hemphill, in Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977),
noted "it is apparent that, throughout the nation and in this Circuit in particular, [this
area of law] is in a total state of disarray." Id. at 732.
The Supreme Court has recently held that jury trials are available under the ADEA.
Lorillard v. Pons, 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978). Accord, Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
1
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comment considers the question of whether awards for pain and
suffering in ADEA suits are proper in light of the Act's enforce-
ment provisions.
To accomplish its goal of eliminating discrimination based
on age, the ADEA prohibits arbitrary age discrimination by em-
ployers, employment agencies, and labor organizations against
"individuals who are at least forty . ..but less than seventy
years of age." 1 The statutory language expressly extends its pro-
tection to the hiring and discharging of employees as well as to
virtually every other matter connected with the employment rela-
tionship." Several matters, however, are excepted from the
419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. li. 1976); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp.
1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Contra, Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976);
Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Platt
v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Punitive damages in excess of the double back pay provisions of the ADEA have
generally been held to be unavailable in suits brought under the Act. See, e.g., Dean v.
American Security Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.
1977) (the district court had allowed a claim for punitive damages in excess of the
liquidated damages provided in the statute); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance
Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F.
Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95.256, 92 Stat. 189.
11. Id. § 623(a)-(c) (1970). These sections specify the prohibitions of the ADEA:
Employer practices
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or other-
wise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportun-
ities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.
Employment agency practices
(b) It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for
employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual because of
such individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on
the basis of such individual's age.
Labor organization practices
(c) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportun-
2
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ADEA proscription of age discrimination. Equality of treatment
is not required when age is a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particu-
lar business" 12 or where the differentiation is "based on reasona-
ble factors other than age."' 3 Furthermore, if the inequality is
based on observance of terms of a bona fide seniority system or
requirements of an employee retirement, pension, or insurance
plan that is not a pretense to avoid compliance with the Act,
differentiation is allowed. 4 Moreover, it is not unlawful to dis-
charge or discipline an employee "for good cause."' 5
Procedurally, the ADEA requires a private individual seek-
ing redress under the Act to seek administrative remedies first.
An aggrieved party must notify the Secretary of Labor not less
than sixty days prior to the commencement of any civil action.'"
Upon notification that the claimant intends to sue, the Secretary
must "notify all persons named therein as prospective defendants
. . . and promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful prac-
tice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persua-
sion."' 7
If attempts at conciliation succeed in obtaining voluntary
compliance and the employee agrees to accept the amount agreed
upon, his right to sue terminates." Likewise, should conciliation
efforts fail and the employee consents to an action brought by the
Secretary, the claimant waives his right of private action. 9 Fi-
nally, if the Secretary sues to enjoin the discrimination and to
restrain further delay in payment of the amount owing because
of unlawful discrimination, the individual's right to sue is extin-
guished."0
ities or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). For a discussion of what constitutes a "bona fide
occupational qualification" under Title VII, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
14. Id. § 623(f)(2). See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3)(1970).
16. Id. § 626(d). See Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1970).
18. Id. § 626(b) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970) (Fair Labor Standards Act)).
19. Id. and 29 U.S.C. § 626(c).
20. Id. § 626(b) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970) (Fair Labor Standards Act)).
See Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1972).
1978]
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The enforcement provisions of the ADEA2' incorporate cer-
tain enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA) ,22 including awards of reasonable attorney's fees and
double back pay upon wilful violation. 2 The ADEA further pro-
vides:
Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this
chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or un-
paid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217
of [the FLSA]: Provided, That liquidated damages shall be
payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any
action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have juris-
diction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appro-
priate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including with-
out limitation judgment compelling employment, reinstatement
or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to
be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
under this section.2
4
Whether this language permits damages beyond the back
wages and liquidated damages available under the FLSA21 for
wilful violations is a question that has produced divergent opin-
ions in the federal courts.2 1 Many courts have vigorously sup-
ported the contention that compensatory damages for pain and
suffering are proper under the language of the statute; other
courts have offered equally vigorous challenges to this opinion.2
21. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
22. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as FLSA].
23. The ADEA enforcement provisions expressly incorporate these sections of the
FLSA: 29 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1970) (encouraging utilization of the services of state and local
agencies and providing for reimbursement for their service); id. § 216(b)-(d) (dealing with
penalties; employer's civil liability including the awarding of attorney's fees and, for wilful
violations, liquidated damages in the amount equal to the unpaid back pay; injunctions;
termination of right of action; waiver of claims; actions by the Secretary; and limitation
of actions); id. § 217 (providing for injunction proceedings and giving jurisdiction to
district courts).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
25. Id. § 216(b) (1970).
26. E.g., Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976);
Wishiewski v. All-Star Ins. Corp., [1977] 7 LB. REL. REP. (BNA) (16 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas.) 231, Coates v. NCR Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Buchholz v. Symons
Mfg. Co., [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 1084.
27. E.g., Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Rodri-
guez v. Taylor, [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 533; Postemski
v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.)
565; Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (16 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas.) 463; Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Rechstei-
[Vol. 29
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The case of Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.2
graphically illustrates the confusion in this area. In that case a
bifurcated trial produced a jury verdict for plaintiff on the issue
of liability arising out of his forced retirement at age sixty. Prior
to the hearing on the issue of damages, the judge granted plain-
tiff's motion to include a claim for compensatory damages for
pain and suffering arising out of the employer's ADEA violations,
despite the absence of express statutory language authorizing
such a recovery. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, the
amount of which was reduced on remittitur from $750,000 to
$200,000.29 On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment of
the district court, holding, in part, that damages for pain and
suffering cannot be awarded in an ADEA case."
In permitting the damages award for pain and suffering, the
district court noted the lack of precedent authorizing such a re-
covery under the ADEA. 1 For authority, the court relied upon a
Supreme Court case involving a claim under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 where the cause of action was compared
to an action in tort.12 The district court concluded that "the
ADEA essentially establishes a new statutory tort . . ."; once
liability is ascertained, "the panoply of usual tort remedies is
available to recompense injured parties for all provable dam-
ages."3
The district court further compared the ADEA "in both pur-
pose and scope" to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 34 and
ner v. Madison Fund, 75 F.R.D. 497 (D.D.C. 1977); Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co.,
[1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 568.
28. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 749 (1978).
29. 404 F. Supp. at 326.
30. 550 F.2d at 842.
31. 404 F. Supp. at 331.
32. Id. at 327, citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (decided under Title VIII
(Fair Housing Act), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970)). The district court quoted directly
from Curtis:
"A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort-the statute
merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a
plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach. As one Court
of Appeals noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions
recognized at common law."
404 F. Supp. at 327. Accord, Coates v. NCR Co., 433 F. Supp. 665 (D. Va. 1977).
33. 404 F. Supp. at 327.
34. Id. at 328. Accord, Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1976). See
generally Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43
BROOKLYN L. REv. 47 (1976); Note, Age Discrimination-Compensatory Damages for Pain
1978]
5
Erwin: Employment Discrimination - Damages - Awarding Compensatory Damag
Published by Scholar Commons, 1978
710 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
observed that "[w]ith a few minor exceptions the prohibitions
of this enactment are in terms identical to those of Title VII...
except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.' ""
The district court correctly stated that the activities pro-
scribed under the ADEA and the prohibitions of Title VII are
almost identical;36 however, the language of the enforcement pro-
visions of the two acts is quite different. The enforcement machi-
nery of the ADEA essentially follows that of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.37 In its lengthy discussion of the legislative history,"
and Suffering Held Recoverable Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 7 SEToN HALL L. REv. 642 (1976).
35. 404 F. Supp. at 328 (quoting Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d
818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972)). Accord, Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311 (6th Cir.
1975).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1970). These sections delineate the prohibitions of
Title VII:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Employment agency practices
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to clas-
sify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Labor organization practices
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any
individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or
as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
Note the resemblance of this language to the language of the ADEA prohibitions as set
out in note 11 supra.
37. Compare ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1970) with FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970). See
Levien, note 8 supra, at 247.
38. 404 F. Supp. at 330-31 n.3.
6
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however, the district court failed to acknowledge a statement
made by a major sponsor of the ADEA bill. 9 In pointing out the
distinctions between the ADEA and Title VII, Senator Jacob Jav-
its expressly noted that "[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
cover age discrimination and [the ADEA bill] does not cover
racial or religious discrimination. The laws will operate com-
pletely independently of each other, as will the enforcement pro-
cedures."'
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Third Circuit
soundly rejected the appropriateness of applying Title VII case
law to ADEA cases:
The two statutes are not consistent because Congress made the
ADEA enforcement provisions a hybrid of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act and Title VII. Thus, it is possible to have lost earnings
doubled because of discrimination based on age, but not on race
or religion. While it is logically beguiling to interpret the stat-
utes in harmony, their clear language often will not permit it.4'
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of equating
the ADEA to Title VII in a case involving jury trials under the
ADEA and found the contention that the two statutes were analo-
gous "unavailing."42 Noting that the statutes were similar in their
aims and prohibitions,43 the Court found that there were
"significant differences" in the "remedial and procedural provi-
sions of the two laws that are crucial."" The Court concluded that
"reliance on Title VII, therefore, is misplaced" 5 in suits involving
39. "It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory language is
in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). For
the importance of the statements of sponsors of legislation in statutory interpretation, see
generally G. FOLsoM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS at
34-35 (1972).
40. 113 CONG. REc. 31255 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Jacob Javits in response to the
question of conflicts in administration of the ADEA as related to the Civil Rights Act of
1964) (emphasis added).
41. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 n.10 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 749 (1978). Significantly, the district court, in deciding whether to award
attorney's fees to plaintiff, had pointed out the incorporation of the FLSA enforcement
provisions in the corresponding section of the ADEA. 404 F. Supp. at 334. The court failed
to note the importance of this point in its earlier discussion of the damages issue.
42. Lorillard v. Pons, 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978). See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
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claims under the ADEA.
The ADEA, unlike the FLSA, authorizes the federal courts
to "grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes [of the Act]."" In interpreting this lan-
guage many courts have held that the ADEA expressly allows the
award of damages for pain and suffering. The opinions of neither
of the courts in Rogers focused on this obviously critical language,
nor the extent to which it varies from the enforcement provisions
of Title VII. Other courts have looked solely to this language, in
the statute's enforcement provisions in deciding the type of dam-
ages recoverable.
In granting an award for pain and suffering, the court in
Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co. 7 relied heavily on the dis-
trict court's opinion in Rogers. After the Third Circuit's reversal
of Rogers, the Bertrand court reconsidered its decision and ex-
pressly rejected the reasoning of the circuit court.48 In supporting
its earlier conclusion the Bertrand court observed: "So long as the
relief effectuates the [ADEA] statutory purpose, the court may
grant such 'legal relief as may be appropriate.' Indeed, the
breadth of the available remedies is underscored by the words
'without limitation' in the subsequent listing of possible means
of relief."4
Another reading of the statutory language was presented in
Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos." The ADEA per-
mits a tribunal "to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate"; following this language, the statute provides a list
of equitable remedies.5 The court in Looney interpreted the word
"legal" as a reference to the liquidated damages award in the
Act's preceding sentence and concluded that since the statute
listed only equitable remedies "the principle of ejusdem generis"
46. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970). See Lorillard v. Pons, 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978).
47. 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd mem., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
Accord, Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
48. 432 F. Supp. at 956.
49. Id. at 953.
50. 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
52. (Footnote added.) BLACK'S LAW DIMONARY 608 (4th rev. ed. 1968) defines this
term:
In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem
generis rule" is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only
[Vol. 29
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limits the available unlisted forms of relief to the same kind of
relief as that enumerated."53 Analogizing to the Sixth Circuit's
decision in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,54 the court stated that
recovery was limited solely to equitable remedies.5
In Dean v. American Security Insurance Co." the district
court recognized the incorporation of the FLSA enforcement pro-
visions into the ADEA, but allowed a claim for punitive and
compensatory pain and suffering damages even though neither
are available under the FLSA. 8 Citing dicta from an earlier
ADEA case, 59 the Dean court noted that "[u]nlike FLSA, the
Age Act is intended to do more than repay employees for unpaid
minimum wages . . . ."I The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court and held that damages for pain and suffering were unavail-
able in a private action under the ADEA.61 The court of appeals,
citing section 7 of the ADEA62 and the enforcement provisions of
the FLSA, rejected the argument that the statutory language,
"legal or equitable relief . . . without limitation,"63 should be
construed to include damages for pain and suffering. "The au-
thorization of 'legal or equitable relief' must be read, not in isola-
to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.
53. 428 F. Supp. at 537.
54. 515 F.2d 301, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1975). In Lorillard v. Pons, 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978),
the Supreme Court, in deciding that jury trials were proper under the statute, noted:
Section 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), does not specify which of the listed categories
of relief are legal and which are equitable. However, since it is clear that judg-
ments compelling "employment, reinstatement, or promotion" are equitable
I.. Congress must have meant the phrase "legal relief" to refer to judgments
"enforcing. . .liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation."
98 S. Ct. at 871 n.11.
55. 428 F. Supp. at 537.
56. 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
57. 429 F. Supp. at 4. The court noted, however, that "because there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion on this issue, the court hereby CERTIFIES the issue for
interlocutory appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)." Id. See also Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437
F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977), wherein Judge Hemphill, relying on the Georgia district court
decision in Dean, denied defendant's motion to strike a claim for compensatory damages
for pain and suffering, and certified the case for interlocutory appeal. Id. at 732.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
59. Brennan v. Paragon Employment Agency, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
60. 429 F. Supp. at 4.
•61. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970).
63. 559 F.2d at 1038.
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tion, but in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act, the
policies they further and the enforcement framework they envi-
sion."64
In Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc.65 the court recognized that the
ADEA combines the available remedies under the ADEA with
those of the FLSA, "requiring that both Acts be read together."6
On this basis the court concluded that "[t]he language of both
Acts makes it clear that any monetary recovery under either Act
is limited to the amount of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid over-
time compensation or . . . liquidated damages." 7 The thrust of
the ADEA is to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination; most viola-
tions are remedied by compelling employment, reinstatement, or
promotion coupled with back pay. The Sant court recognized this
proposition:
The Act draws its parameters of protected interests around the
pecuniary employment relationship between the employer and
the employee. Personal interests, such as bodily and mental
integrity, are well outside the boundaries of the Act .... [T]o
allow recovery for pain and suffering would transform the ADEA
from an act that seeks to eliminate and redress age discrimina-
tion to one for personal injuries."
The Third Circuit in Rogers, noting the ADEA-FLSA corre-
lation, followed the Sant rationale and, in addition, pointed out
the policy considerations behind the ADEA's remedial provi-
sions.69 The circuit court largely ignored the district court's reli-
ance on statements made during congressional debates on the
ADEA bill and observed that "there is no indication that Con-
gress thought the means which it adopted to make employment
a reality were inadequate to afford reasonable relief."70 A crucial
factor in the decision was that specific forms of remedies had been
enumerated, while penalty provisions had been restricted to wil-
ful violations. The court concluded that "[tlo allow psychic dis-
64. Id. Accord, Williams v. General Motors Corp., [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
(15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 411; Cobb v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., [1977] 7 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) (15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 408; Crispen v. Southern Cross Indus., [1977] 7 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) (15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 405.
65. 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
66. Id. at 622.
67. Id.
68. 424 F. Supp. at 622.
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tress awards in addition would in a very real sense thwart the
limitation Congress thought advisable to impose."
7 1
Administrative remedies are clearly preferred in proceedings
under the ADEA. During hearings on the bill "the Congressional
committees emphasized that the most favored method of enforce-
ment was conciliation and mediation. '72 Furthermore, awards for
pain and suffering are an unusual remedy in any administrative
proceeding 3 and are only granted when clearly authorized by
statutory language .7 The ADEA is silent on the issue of whether
pain and suffering damages may be granted at the administrative
level. It follows that Congress did not contemplate this remedy
when a case proceeds outside the administrative framework and
into the courts. It is unlikely that Congress intended to encourage
large recoveries of pain and suffering damages in civil actions
when such amounts are unavailable at the administrative level.
If large recoveries are allowable under the ADEA, it is doubtful
that alleged age discriminatees will enter into good faith confer-
ence and conciliation when around the corner lies the possibility
of large dollar pain and suffering recoveries. 75
The administrative system of mediation and conciliation so
favored by Congress is jeopardized when awards are made for
pain and suffering at the trial level. 6 An element of uncertainty,
the possibility of recovering a larger amount of money in a private
suit, is injected into a system that already provides an objective
measure of damages-the amount of lost wages. The silence of the
ADEA on the scope of the remedy further indicates that Congress
did not intend to award such compensation. The Fifth Circuit, in
reversing the district court in Dean, agreed that the ADEA's si-
lence concerning these damages "is entirely consistent with legis-
71. Id.
72. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967) (quoted in Rogers v. Exxon Re-
search & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 749 (1978)).
See generally Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique,
19 N.Y.L.F. 309, 319 (1973); Callahan and Richardson, Protecting the Older Worker, 6
U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 214, 221 (1972); Charme, Age Discrimination in Employment, 11
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 281, 291 (1975).
73. 550 F.2d at 841 (1977). See U.A.W.-C.I.O. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643 (1958).
74. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, §§ 200-212 (1976).
75. 424 F. Supp. at 622. Accord, Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834,
841 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 749 (1978). Travers v. Coming Glass Works, 76
F.R.D. 431, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
76. The employee must consent to the administrative process. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)-
(c) (1970). See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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lative intent to abstain from introducing a volatile ingredient into
the tripartite negotiations involving Secretary, employee and
employer which might well be calculated to frustrate rather than
to 'effectuate the purposes' of the Act."7
Those supporting the allowance of pain and suffering dam-
ages in ADEA cases consistently cite remarks made by Repre-
sentative Dwyer before the House passed the bill:78
When a man or woman of 55, for instance, loses his job, he faces
the prospect of long months of frustration, fear, and insecurity
as he searches for a new one. And the odds are heavily against
his finding new employment similar in kind and pay to his for-
mer position-no matter how skilled and experienced and vigor-
ous he may be. The cost of such an experience in terms of mental
anguish, family suffering, lost income, and damaged self-respect
is too high to measure. One must observe it at firsthand-as I
am confident many of our colleagues have-to appreciate how
painful and how unnecessary it all is.79
The contention by the proponents of pain and suffering
awards that Representative Dwyer's statement denotes specific
congressional intent to alleviate such suffering by allowing com-
pensatory damages was succinctly rebutted in Platt v. Burroughs
Corp.
80
The implication is, therefore, that the use of the italicized words
conveyed the idea that the proposed statute provided for "tort"
recovery for pain and suffering. On the contrary the conclusion
is reasonable that the speaker was emphasizing the importance
of passing a proposed statute, rather than speaking with respect
to the remedies provided in it. If this is not so, how can we
explain the failure of the House . . . to rewrite the proposed
statute before passing it, to include specifically for the recovery
of damages for pain and suffering? It is certainly not because the
statute as drafted and passed so clearly provides for recovery of
damages based upon pain and suffering .... 11
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed
77. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1977).
78. See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 331 n.3 (D.N.J.
1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 749 (1978).
79. 113 CONG. REc. 34751 (1967), (remarks of Rep. Dwyer), quoted in Platt v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (emphasis supplied by the Platt
court).
80. 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
81. Id. at 1338.
[Vol. 29
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the issue of whether to allow damages for pain and suffering in
ADEA cases. Though the Court recently denied a petition for
certiorari to review the circuit court's decision in Rogers,82 the
Court's analysis in the recent ADEA case of Lorillard v. Pons,"
holding a jury trial available on the issue of lost wages, is applica-
ble to the issue of pain and suffering damages.
In Lorillard the Court compared the ADEA with both Title
VII and the FLSA, noting that the ADEA was "something of a
hybrid" of these two statutes.8 4 The Court, however, clearly dis-
tinguished the remedial provisions of Title VII from those of the
ADEA.5 The Court opined that Congress' incorporation of the
FLSA provisions "strongly suggests that. . . it intended to incor-
porate fully the remedies and procedures of the FLSA"88 and
concluded that "violations of the ADEA generally are to be
treated as violations of the FLSA." 7 The Court quoted the lan-
guage of the ADEA: "Amounts owing. . . as a result of a viola-
tion of the ADEA are to be treated as 'unpaid minimum wages
or overtime compensation' under the FLSA . . .,.
The Court's opinion thus suggests that only those amounts
available under the FLSA are allowed in remedying ADEA vio-
lations. Since awards for pain and suffering are not available
under the FLSA,89 they are not available under the ADEA. The
82. 98 S. Ct. 749 (1978).
83. 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978).
84. Id. at 869.
85. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
86. 98 S. Ct. at 871.
87. Id. at 869.
88. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970)). The Conference Report on the ADEA
Amendments of 1978 also reflects this interpretation:
Under section 7(b), which incorporates the remedial scheme of sections 11(b),
16 and 17 of the FLSA, "amounts owing" contemplates two elements: First, it
includes items of pecuniary or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other
job-related benefits. Second, it includes liquidated damages (calculated as an
amount equal to the pecuniary loss) which compensate the aggrieved party for
nonpecuniary losses arising out of a willful violation of the ADEA. ...
...[The] Supreme Court has made clear that an award of liquidated damages
under the FLSA is not a penalty but rather is available in order to provide full
compensatory relief for losses that are "too obscure and difficult of proof for
estimate other than by liquidated damages."
H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 973, 1007 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This reference may indicate a
congressional intent that courts should not award damages for pain and suffering in ADEA
cases.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
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Court's decision in Lorillard, as well as the statutory language,
legislative history, and policy considerations developed in the
case law, indicate that awards for pain and suffering are pre-
cluded in suits brought under the ADEA.
Sue C. Erwin
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